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In a recent oral argument, a judge on the California Court of Appeal
told me they had "at least 50" pending cases on the constitutionality of
probation conditions authorizing suspicionless earches of digital devices.
As counsel of record in three of those cases, I feel positioned to comment
on this hot topic within criminal law. My intention here is less to reconcile
California's cases on suspicionless searches of probationers' digital
devices than to locate them within the precedents of the United States
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently I represented a juvenile (I.V.) who trashed his
bedroom in a tantrum that was later adjudicated as an act of
vandalism.' I appealed a probation condition imposed by the trial
court as part of his guilty plea, by which he agreed to suspicionless
searches of his property. The condition was as run-of-the-mill as
they come-of a type imposed over and over by trial courts,
invariant to probationers' crimes of conviction. In my briefs on
I.V.'s behalf, I characterized the condition as unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.2 Any search relying on the condition, I went
on, would violate the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures.3
At oral argument before the California Court of Appeal for
the Fourth District, Justice Judith Haller seemed sympathetic, but her
interest was fleeting. After hearing a summary of I.V.'s plight, she
asked me to riff on something else altogether. The court, Justice
Haller explained, had before it "at least 50" cases involving
probation conditions authorizing suspicionless searches not just of
property (in a general sense), but of digital devices (in a specific
sense). I did have a case of that variety-a so-called explicit
electronics condition-then percolating in the state high court on
appeal from an adverse ruling by a panel on which Justice Haller
sat.4 In response to her invitation, I undertook less to reconcile
* Earl Warren Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
1 In re L V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
2 Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, In re I.V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535 (Ct. App.
2017) (No. D07061 1).
3 Id. at 22.
4 People v. Nachbar, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 857, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016),
review granted and briefing deferred, No. S238210, 384 P.3d 1242 (Cal. Dec. 14,
2016).
3 [Vol. 50: 1
CERTAIN CERTIORARI
California's cases on suspicionless searches of probationers' digital
devices and more to locate them within the precedents of the United
States Supreme Court, which is bound to pick up a case for the same
purpose.
Specifically, the Court is bound to hear whether Riley v.
California-its 2014 ruling excluding content found on digital
devices in warrantless searches of arrestees' grab-area5-applies to
probationers. David Riley's case arose out of his arrest when police
lawfully found firearms under the hood of his car.6 Incident to
Riley's arrest, police found evidence of his gang membership in a
search of his cell phone, which placed itself at an unsolved
shooting.7 After an unsuccessful motion to suppress the contents of
his phone, Riley was convicted of various assaultive offenses, all
made worse by having been done for the benefit of a gang.8 His state
court appeal went nowhere.9
That from there the Supreme Court granted Riley review was
unsurprising. Four years earlier, the Court predicted its involvement
in the Fourth Amendment's regulation of digital privacy. 10 Precisely,
City of Ontario v. Quon upheld a municipal police department's
discovery of extra-professional text messages in an audit of a SWAT
officer's department-issue pager." Assuming, arguendo, the officer's
expectation of privacy in the content of the messages, the Court found the
warrantless search of the digital device reasonable in a Fourth
Amendment sense, given the government's "special need[]" to regulate
public employees.12 Within its narrow ruling, the Court acknowledged
that digital devices have profoundly altered human activity, " the legal
contours of which remain open despite eighty-two years of electronic
surveillance litigation. Because those devices might be "essential means
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
6 Id. at 2480.
7 Id. at 2480-81.
I Id. at 2481.
9 People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *2-6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2013), review denied May 1, 2013, cert. granted, Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 999 (2014).
1o City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759-60 (2010).
" Id. at 746, 750, 751, 752-53, 765.
12 Id. at 756, 760.
13 Id. at 760.
2017] 4
CONNECTICUT LAWREVIEW ONLINE
identification," 14 their Fourth Amendment implications would need
tending beyond searches of public employees' department-issue
devices. But picking the right case would be delicate:
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on
the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become
clear. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the Court relied on its
own knowledge and experience to conclude that there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone
booth. See id., at 360-361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It
is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a
ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in
the instant case are used to establish far-reaching
premises ... .1s
The occasion turned out to be Riley, where the court privileged the
"privacies of life" over the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."1 6 But what, exactly, are Riley's implications? Is it just a
technical ruling on the privacy interests only of arrestees, with no
specific applicability to post-conviction phases of criminal cases?
Because the Court's most on-point precedents-one involving a
probationer (United States v. Knights),17 the other a parolee (Samson
v. California)18-indicate no stance on Riley's applicability beyond
the arrest context, California courts improvidently consider those
precedents legal non-events. Ultimately, the Court will settle the
matter itself, almost certainly within one of the eleven electronics
conditions cases19 now on review in the California Supreme Court.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 759.
16 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 2495 (2014).
17 534 U.S. 112, 114-16 (2001).
1 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006).
19 In re Ricardo P., 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883 (2015), reh'g denied (Nov. 24,
2015), review granted and opinion superseded, 365 P.3d 343 (Cal. 2016); In
re Patrick F., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 847 (2015), reh'g denied (Dec. 3, 2015),
review granted and opinion superseded, 365 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2016); In re
5 [Vol. 50: 1
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Here is why and how.
II. INRE L V.: ARE PHONES "PROPERTY"?
At 9:30 AM on May 24, 2016, Chula Vista, California police
were called to a disturbance at the home I.V. shared with his mother,
aunt, siblings, and grandparents. After arguing with his mother about
money, I.V. threw a fit in his room, damage to which prompted the
district attorney to file a delinquency petition alleging one count of
felony vandalism. Attributing to I.V. only damage to the door frame
in an amount of sixty dollars, the juvenile court found him to have
violated the lesser-included, misdemeanor version of the felony
allegation. In addition to consigning I.V. to a day reformatory for a
year, the court imposed various conditions recommended by court
probation officers, including condition number 27 (No. 27), which
permitted suspicionless searches of his "person, property, vehicle,
and any property under his immediate custody or control." 20
A. THE VAGUENESS OF PROBATION CONDITION No. 27
Central to I.V.'s appeal was whether condition No. 27 was
unconstitutionally vague for insufficiently stating what property was
subject to search. Relying on the due process right to adequate notice
of criminal laws, appellate courts have struck down as vague
Alejandro R., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (2015), review granted and opinion
superseded, 366 P.3d 528 (Cal. 2016); In re Mark C., 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865,
review granted and opinion superseded, 368 P.3d 311 (Cal. 2016); In re A.S.,
200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, review granted and opinion superseded, 370 P.3d 1052
(Cal. 2016); In re R.F., No. A145723, 2016 WL 4039794 (Cal. Ct. App. July
28, 2016), review granted (Oct. 12, 2016); In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28 (Ct.
App. 2016); People v. Nachbar, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855 (Ct. App. 2016); In re
George F., 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, reh'g denied (July 22, 2016), review
dismissed, 382 P.3d 1136 (Cal. 2016); In re Q.R., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374 (Ct.
App. 2017); In re J.R., No. A147835, 2017 WL 396668, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 30, 2017), review granted (Apr. 12, 2017); In re Carlos H., No. A148154,
2017 WL 695953, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017), review granted (May
10, 2017).
20 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
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probation conditions that could be inadvertently violated.21
Inadequate notice of a law occurs when "persons of common
intelligence must . . . guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."22 To survive a vagueness challenge, a condition must be
precise enough for the probationer to know what is required of him
and for the court to determine whether the condition has been
violated.23
It was my position that, by extending to IV.'s "property ...
and any property under his immediate custody or control," condition
No. 27 left open whether a refusal to submit personal information
stored on his electronic devices would violate his probation.24 All
property is either real (land and that which is affixed or appurtenant
thereto), or personal (all property which is not real). Personal
property may be either tangible or intangible. Tangible personal
property is "seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or . . . in any
other manner perceptible to the senses."25 Intangible property is
"personal property that is not itself intrinsically valuable, but that
derives its value from what it represents or evidences."26
No one would mistake an electronic device for real property.
And while a cell phone may seem a clear and high example of
tangible personal property, its contents are equally intangible. To the
California Supreme Court, classifying property as tangible as
opposed to intangible can be a "troublesome" task in some cases.27
And I.V.'s, as I saw it, was such a case. Condition No. 27's
vagueness, I.V.'s argument ran, arose not from whether the device
itself is tangible personal property (it is), but from whether, given its
intangible contents, that tangible-intangible distinction is captured by
the unmodified word "property" (it isn't). Because any determination of
21 E.g., In re H.C., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 795-96 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Sheena
K., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 446 (2004), opinion superseded by In re Sheena K., 153
P.3d 282 (Cal. 2007).
22 People v. Freitas, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 53-54 (2009).
23 In re Sheena K., 153 P.3d 282, 294 (Cal. 2007) (citing People v. Reinertson,
223 Cal. Rptr. 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1986)).
24 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 22.
25 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 6016 (2017).
26 Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 884 P.2d 108, 110
(Cal. 1994).
27 Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 P.3d 1148, 1156 (Cal. 2001).
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whether a cell phone is property turns on that distinction, the
unmodified word "property" is, I concluded, in that context void for
vagueness.
The prosecution deemed I.V.'s vagueness challenge
"insubstantial."28 Citing a case from 1987, the prosecution recalled
that "probation conditions containing this term have been in use for
years."29 To the prosecution, because everyone knows that
"property" means real and personal, tangible and intangible,
electronics search conditions need not be explicit to be
constitutional.3 0 But no published opinion has so held.3 1 The one
published case featuring a condition allowing suspicionless searches
of "property"-not delineating electronics-the prosecution dubbed
"inapposite,,"32 since that condition not only threatened a search, but
produced one too.
There, in United States v. Lara, the Ninth Circuit suppressed
evidence that probation officers found in a cell-phone search based on
an electronics condition imposed on a probationer convicted of drug
offenses. In lieu of prison, Paulo Lara had accepted suspicionless
searches of his "property," a designation the Ninth Circuit found
precluded electronics.34 As authority, the court looked to Riley,35
which declared that an electronic device is not "property" in the
same sense as "a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse."3 6 Calling the
condition neither vague nor overbroad, but invalidating the ensuing
search as unreasonable in Fourth Amendment terms, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that "privacy is 'significantly diminished'
when a defendant's probation order 'clearly expressed the search
condition' of which the probationer 'was unambiguously
28 Respondent's Brief at 20, In re I.V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535 (Ct. App. 2017)
(No. D070611).
29 Id. at 17 (citing People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 342-43 (Cal. 1987)).
30 Id. at 19.
31 See People v. Garcia, No. C082617, 2017 WL 2334413, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 30, 2017), review denied (Sept. 20, 2017) (unpublished decision
holding defendant's probation search condition encompassing a search of a cell
phone in defendant's possession objectively reasonable).
32 Respondent's Brief, supra note 28, at 20.
33 United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 611-12 (9th Cir. 2016).
34 Id. at 607.
35 Id. at 610-12.
36 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-89 (2014).
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informed." '3 7 But Lara, like I.V., had accepted no such explicit
condition.
The absence of the word "vague" from the opinion makes
Lara no less instructive in LV., where the mischief of the vague
condition had yet to produce an illegal search. No doubt a vague
condition is unconstitutional whether or not police have found
occasion to rely on it. Lara's value thus is in demonstrating that the
risk of law enforcement exploiting, even inadvertently, the vagueness
of unelaborated references to "property," is hardly hypothetical. The
risk of the intrusion that materialized in Lara should have been
reason enough to enjoin such an eventuality in LV. rather than force
I.V. and those similarly situated to await an unconstitutional search
before judicial relief is available.
Nor does the fact that the word "property" is in dictionaries
tell us anything about its vagueness. No word in dictionaries is vague
in the abstract, that is, out of context. Any word that is vague in the
abstract would not be in a dictionary, which displays words whose
application is knowable, not just guesswork. While "property" is not
vague as an idle entry in a dictionary, it has become vague in specific
speech-situations due to tensions among technology, privacy, and
police practices as regulated by courts.
Accordingly, the prosecution's observation that suspicionless
searches of probationers' "property" go back thirty years38 says
nothing about the term today, when suspicionless earches of digital
devices must be expressly stated in any probation condition with a
hope of surviving constitutional challenge. "It would be foolish," the
Supreme Court noted in 2001, "to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.. .. The question . .. today
is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy." 3 9 Given the flux in which the legal
relation of technology and privacy remains in 2017, an
"insubstantial" constitutional claim of vagueness I.V.'s was not.
37 Lara, 815 F.3d at 610 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-
20 (2001)).
38 See Respondent's Brief, supra note 28, at 17 (citing a case from 1987 to
illustrate that suspicionless searches have been "in use for years").
'9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
9 [Vol. 50: 1
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Because the relation between digital devices and "property" is
too open to give the notice needed to survive a vagueness challenge,
I.V. asked the Court of Appeal to modify the search condition as
follows: "The minor shall submit for suspicionless search his person,
vehicle, and the physical aspects of his property and of any property
under his immediate custody or control at any time."40 But the court
declined.41 Instead, like the prosecution, the court recorded that
"probation conditions authorizing searches of a probationer's person,
property, and vehicle are 'routinely imposed."'4 2
Unlike the prosecution, however, the court found "no
indication in this case that in imposing the standard search condition,
the juvenile court intended to authorize searches of I.V.'s electronic
data."4 3 "Reasonably construed," the court posited, "the search
condition applies only to tangible physical property, and not to
electronic data."4 4 Citing as authority both Lara and the "sea
change" brought about by the "digital revolution," the court
remarked that only "an explicit search condition pertaining to
electronic data" could authorize a search of a probationer's
intangible property.45
Yet the fact that the prosecution presupposed that "property"
subsumes intangible interests, while the court presupposed the
opposite, indicates the ambiguity of the word "property" in this
context: both interpretations are plausible. The court supported its
position in a footnote:
This interpretation is consistent with California's
recently enacted Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, which limits government entities' access to
"electronic device information." Although the statute
generally requires "specific consent" or a warrant
before a government entity may access electronic
device information, a government entity may also
access such information "if the device is seized from
40 In re I. V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 547.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 546.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 547.
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an authorized possessor of the device who is subject
to an electronic device search as a clear and
unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory
supervision, or pretrial release."46
The court's explication of the recent Act is incomplete. The original
Act permitted official access to electronic communications only with
specific consent from an owner or rightful possessor of the device, an
exigency, or judicial authorization.47 But the California Legislature
promptly recognized that consent to probation conditions in exchange
for a suspended prison term might be read to count as the "specific"
consent required to override section 1546.1's ban on official access
to electronic communications. An amendment then clarified that such
access is allowed when "the device is seized from an authorized
possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search
as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation . . . ."48 The
amendment thus acknowledged two realities: first, "consent" as
understood in the original Act was not meant to extend to a search
victim's electronic devices; and second, the original iteration of the
Act was susceptible to such a plausible but mistaken reading. Indeed, the
Legislature would have had no occasion to amend the Act if not for
the plausible interpretation that generalized suspicionless search
conditions imposed on "property" extend to electronics. Yet without
engaging the implications of the amendment, the Court of Appeal
rejected I.V.'s vagueness challenge, finding off the mark both his and
the prosecution's readings of condition No. 27.
B. THE OVERBREADTH OF PROBATION CONDITION No. 27
Because condition No. 27 may be fairly construed to include
electronics, I characterized it on appeal as unconstitutionally
46 Id. at 547 n. 16 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546. 1(c)(10) (2017)).
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 et seq. (2016).
48 Electronic Surveillance-Communications-Searches and Seizures, ch.
541, 2016 Cal. Stat. 3878; Law Enforcement Agencies-Electronic Surveillance-
Orders, ch. 511, 2016 Cal. Stat. 3777 (codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §
1546.1(c)(10) (2017)).
49 In re I. V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 546-47.
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overbroad in the same way that explicit electronics conditions are
overbroad.so While the vagueness doctrine enforces the due process
requirement of notice, a clear and precise enactment may be
overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. When
laws threaten to invade protected freedoms, reviewing courts modify
them into less drastic means for achieving the same purpose.
Prior to I.V.'s disposition, the California Court of Appeal for the
First District had repeatedly found explicit electronics conditions
overbroad in appeals brought by juveniles.5 1 Finding support in
Riley, those overbreadth challenges succeeded even though juveniles
need more supervision than adults and their constitutional rights are
more circumscribed. Representative of those successful overbreadth
challenges is In re Malik J.52 After admitting in 2012 to a robbery,
Malik was found to have committed three more robberies on one
night in 2014.ss The juvenile court imposed the following condition:
[P]rovide all passwords to any electronic devices
including cell phones, computers and notepads within
your custody and control, and submit to search of
devices at any time to any peace officer. And also
provide any passwords to any social media sites ...
and submit those sites to any peace officer with or
without a warrant.54
On appeal, the prosecution argued that because Malik. J. owned no
cell phone but had robbed others of theirs, any device found on him
50 Id. at 540.
51 See, e.g. In re Ricardo P., 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 895 (Ct. App. 2015) ("We
agree with Ricardo that the electronics search condition is overbroad because it is
not 'narrowly tailored for the purposes of public safety and rehabilitation' and 'is
not narrowly tailored to him in particular."'); In re J.B., 242 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589,
756-57 (Ct. App. 2015) ("The requirement that he submit his electronic devices
for search and provide his probation officer with his electronic passwords is
constitutionally overbroad and must be stricken."); In re P.O., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d
841, 848 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The electronics search condition is overbroad because
it is not narrowly tailored to further P.O.'s rehabilitation.").
52 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370 (Ct. App. 2015).
53 Id. at 372-73.
54 Id. at 373.
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could be lawfully searched, digital content included, to see if the
device was stolen.55 Relying on Riley's emphasis on "the ubiquitous
advent of cell phones and their capacity both to store and to remotely
access vast quantities of personal information," the court concluded
that "identifying whether an electronic device is stolen has no
relationship to accessing the content of [Malik J.'s] social media
accounts."56 To permit electronics searches "without violating the
probationer's diminished privacy interests," the court modified the
overbroad condition.57
Three months before I.V.'s disposition, the California Court of
Appeal for the Sixth District decided People v. Appleton, invalidating
on overbreadth grounds a probation condition in an adult prosecution
stating that Appleton's "computers and electronic devices shall be
subject to search for material prohibited by law."58 After reaching
out to his minor victim on a social-media site, Appleton undertook
with him an illegal sexual relation for which he was convicted.59 The
Court of Appeal held that the condition unconstitutionally risked
encroachment on areas of Appleton's life, including "medical
records, financial records, personal diaries, and intimate
correspondence with family and friends," all unrelated to his
criminality.60
Citing favorable precedent, Appleton distinguished contrary
precedent for predating Riley, featuring more narrowly drafted
conditions, or failing outright to engage the Fourth Amendment.61 In
the Sixth District's view, the electronics condition imposed on
Appleton threatened intrusions beyond conventional conditions
granting official access to "probationers' persons, vehicles, and
homes."62 "Even the most basic phones that sell for less than $20,"
the court went on, "might hold photographs, picture messages, text
messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry
5 Id. at 374.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 375, 378.
5 People v. Appleton, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637, 639 (Ct. App. 2016).
59 Id. at 640.
60 Id. at 644.
61 Id. at 645-46.
62 Id. at 644.
13 [Vol. 50: 1
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phone book, and so on." 63 Rather than throw out the condition
altogether, the court recommended a narrower version obligating
Appleton to "provide his social media accounts and passwords to his
probation officer for monitoring" and "maintain his browser history"
for specified durations for on-demand inspection.64 That, the court
concluded, would bring the overbroad condition back within the
reasonableness limits of the Fourth Amendment.65
I.V.'s digital privacy was not he subject of the prosecution's
responsive brief, which sought to dodge the issue on procedural
grounds. Precisely, the prosecution claimed that "infringements on
federal constitutional rights, outside of the First Amendment context,
cannot support an overbreadth challenge."6 6 Held out as authority for
that proposition was a United States Supreme Court footnote, which
the prosecution dug up from a California Supreme Court footnote,
which stated:
Because we conclude that he Santa Ana ordinance is
not overbroad, we need not decide whether the
overbreadth doctrine is applicable outside the area of
freedoms protected by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has stated that overbreadth challenges
will be entertained only if a First Amendment
violation is alleged. "[O]utside the limited First
Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be
attacked as overbroad."6 7
The state high court went on in that same footnote to concede:
Other decisions of the United States Supreme Court
suggest that this limitation is not invariably observed.
We will assume arguendo that the overbreadth
doctrine may be applied outside the First Amendment
context.68
63 Id.
64 Id. at 646-47.
65 Id.
66 Respondent's Brief, supra note 28, at 21 n.5.
67 See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1160 n.15 (Cal. 1995)
(quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268-69 n.18 (1984)) (emphasis added).
68 See id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-59 n.8 (1983))
2017] 14
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Apart from specific overbreadth challenges to subpoenas and
search warrants, overbreadth challenges are brought on more
generalized Fourth Amendment grounds: sometimes successfully,69
sometimes not.70 When Fourth Amendment overbreadth challenges
fail, it is not for having been improvidently brought under the wrong
amendment; rather, the adverse rulings are on the merits.7 1 The
putative bar to I.V.'s claim to which the prosecution pointed,
therefore, was, in a word, exaggerated.
But that did not stop the Court of Appeal from avoiding the
merits of I.V.'s overbreadth claim. Trial counsel failed to raise it
below, and I had characterized the claim in a manner perceived to be
too particularized to count as a facial challenge cognizable on
appeal.72 Not that it matters here, given that the same division within
the Fourth District had, by the time of its ruling in LV., made its
position on the merits known in the appeal of an explicit electronics
condition brought by another client of mine: adult probationer
Steven Nachbar.
In Nachbar, the Fourth District took guidance from In re J.E.,
where the First District upheld an electronics condition against a
juvenile burglar with a drug problem.74 Contrary to other cases that
upheld electronics conditions by predating, ignoring, or just waving at
Riley, the First District attempted in earnest to distinguish Riley with a
line nicked from United States Supreme Court cases detailing the
rights of parolees at first,7 s and later of probationers.76 That line
posits that adjudicated criminals "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled.'"7 7 No longer needing In re J.E. as
authority, the Fourth District now relies on its own opinion in
(emphasis added).
69 E.g., Appleton, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 643.
70 E.g., People v. Nachbar, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 860-61 (Ct. App. 2016),
review granted, 384 P.3d 1242 (Cal. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. S238210).
71 E.g., In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28, 35-39 (Ct. App. 2016), review
granted, 381 P.3d 232 (Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (No. S236628).
72 In re I. V., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 544-45.
73 See Nachbar, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860-61 (finding In re J.E. "persuasive").
74 Id.; In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31.
75 E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
76 E.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (quoting
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480).
77 In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 119 (2001)).
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Nachbar, which it has cited for its potentially persuasive value
twenty-four times in the fifteen months since handing it down.7 ' Nor
is the Fourth District alone in relying on Nachbar to justify
electronics conditions by declaring Riley inapposite. Accordingly, it
may repay the effort to go over what the U.S. Supreme Court sees as
the legal distinction not only between adjudicated criminals and
suspects, but also between different modes of adjudicated criminals:
parolees versus probationers. Only then can we get a sense of the
post-Riley scope of the digital privacy rights of probationers like I.V.
or those subject to explicit electronics conditions.
78 People v. Trujillo, No. D070215, 2017 WL 410200, at *2 & n.2 (Cal. 4th
Ct. App. Div. 1, review granted Apr. 12, 2017); People v. Penn, No. D070506,
2017 WL 999244, at *3 (Cal. 4th Ct. App. Div. 1, review granted May 24, 2017);
People v. Kent, No. D070971, 2017 WL 1033675, at *2 (Cal. 4th Ct. App. Div. 1
March 17, 2017); People v. Bessette, D069633, No. 2017 WL 1399741, at *8 n.3
(Cal. 4th Ct. App. Div. 1 April 19, 2017); In re Christopher 0., No. D070476,
2017 WL 1507497, at *4 & n.3 (Cal. 4th Ct. App. Div. 1 April 27, 2017); In re
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III. PROBATIONERS' PRIVACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. KNIGHTS: A Low-SusPICIoN SEARCH OF A PROBATIONER
On May 29, 1998, Mark Knights was placed on summary
probation for a misdemeanor drug offense. Among the terms on his
probation form was that Knights "submit his . . . person, property,
place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects, to search at any
time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement
officer." 79 That same date, he was sentenced to ninety days in jail, to
commence on August 3, 1998.0
On June 1, 1998 (three days after the judgment of sentence),
"a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) power transformer and adjacent
Pacific Bell telecommunications vault near the Napa County Airport
were pried open and set on fire with an incendiary device using a
gasoline accelerant, causing an estimated $1.5 million in damage.""
Knights had been suspected of prior acts of vandalism against PG&E
property, based on his two-year grudge over a theft-of-services
complaint against him by company investigators, and because they
turned off his electricity for failure to pay his bill. 82 On June 3,
1998, after sheriffs developed cause to suspect Knights as the
vandal, a detective, relying on the consent-to-search condition of
Knights' probation order, broke into and searched his apartment.8 3
Found therein were a "detonation cord, ammunition, liquid
chemicals, chemistry and electrical manuals, drug paraphernalia, and
a brass padlock stamped 'PG&E."' 84
Based on the items found in his apartment, sheriffs arrested
Knights, who landed in federal court on an indictment for conspiracy
to commit arson, possession of an unregistered destructive device,
and being a felon in possession of ammunition.85 After the district
79 Brief of Petitioner at *10, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)
(No. 00-1260), 2001 WL 799254.
Id. at *2 n.1.
* Id. at *3.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *3-4.
1 United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534
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court suppressed the incriminating evidence, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, both courts relying on a legal basis that had by then been
repudiated by the United States Supreme Court.86
On the government's appeal, the Court reversed,17 flicking
off the lower courts' defunct basis for suppressing the vidence.88
The real issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the unanimous
Court, was whether official need for the evidence outweighed the
intrusiveness of the apartment search.89 In the Court's view, sheriffs
had sufficient individualized suspicion of Knights due to his
probationary status, thereby rendering the search reasonable in
Fourth Amendment terms.90
For support, the Court quoted Morrissey v. Brewer, its 1972
case that originated the above-quoted line that persons convicted of
crimes (there, a parolee) "do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled."91 The Court also emphasized that Knights
knew what he was getting into: agreeing to the suspicionless search
condition was his only way to avoid prison.92 Likewise, because
probationers are more likely to re-offend than law-abiding persons
(and desperate to conceal evidence to avoid revocation to boot), the
Court continued, "the balance of these considerations requires no
more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this
probationer's house."9 3 In light of the district court's finding, which
was conceded by Knights, "that the search in this case was supported
by reasonable suspicion," the Court reversed the rulings below. 94
B. SAMSON: A No-SUSPICION SEARCH OF A PAROLEE
Donald Samson was on state parole in California from a
U.S. 112 (2001).
86 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 116 (2001) (explaining that the
district court and the Ninth Circuit relied on the same basis of excluding the
evidence, mainly that the search was done for pretextual "investigatory" reasons).
87 Id. at 122.
8 Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
89 Id. at 118-19.
90 Id. at 122.
91 Id. at 119 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 121.
94 Id. at 122; see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at *3 n.3.
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conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Section 3067
of the California Penal Code requires that all prisoners eligible for
release on parole receive an "advisement that he or she is subject to
search or seizure by a probation or parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search
warrant or with or without cause."95 In September 2002, a San Bruno
police officer ran into Samson, whom he recognized as a parolee, a
suspicion confirmed by radio dispatch.9 6 Based on Samson's parolee
status, the officer searched him, discovering a baggie of
methamphetamine inside a cigarette box.97
Charged by the State with possession, Samson's motion to
suppress was denied because the searching officer acted under the
authority of section 3067.98 After a jury convicted Samson, the trial
court sentenced him to imprisonment for seven years,99 six of which
owed largely to his prior convictions.loo In an unpublished opinion,
the Court of Appeal affirmed, summarizing that suspicionless
searches of parolees are lawful unless "arbitrary, capricious or
harassing," which the search of Samson was not. 101
The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted
Samson's petition for certiorari "to answer a variation of the
question [the] Court left open in United States v. Knights."102
Notably, Knights had said nothing about the legal distinction
between the sort of low-suspicion search to which Knights was
exposed (on the one hand), and a no-suspicion search (on the other).
The distinction was not lost on the Knights Court, which dropped this
footnote to that end:
We do not decide whether the probation condition so
diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights'
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by
95 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3067(a)-(b)(3) (2012).
96 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846-47 (2006).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 847.
99 Id.
100 People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 14, 2004).
101 Id. at *2-3.
102 Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
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a law enforcement officer without any individualized
suspicion would have satisfied . . . the Fourth
Amendment. The terms of the probation condition
permit such a search, but we need not address the
constitutionality of a suspicionless search because the
search in this case was supported by reasonable
suspicion.lo0
Samson's "variation" on Knights was to extend the same question
from the probation context to the parole context. Specifically,
Samson addressed "whether a condition of release can so diminish or
eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that
a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend
the Fourth Amendment."104
C. THE "CONTINUUM" OF STATE RESTRICTIONS ON AUTONOMY
To the Supreme Court, that Knights was a probationer and
Samson a parolee was an operative distinction based on their
respective positions on a "continuum" of state restrictions on
autonomy.1 0 5 Imprisonment, the most restrictive measure on the
continuum, is followed by parole, which is less restrictive than
prison, but more restrictive than probation, which, in turn, is more
restrictive than a state of "absolute liberty." 106 Whereas parole is an
executive function by which prisoners are released before their
court-imposed terms expire, probation is a judicial function by which
convicted persons bypass prison altogether. In other words, one cannot
get sentenced to parole. Because parolees are by definition felons (most
with criminal histories), they get the "stronger medicine" of
imprisonment, which would be excessive punishment for probationers,
who as misdemeanants or first-time felons, pose lesser social harms.107
103 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6.
104 Samson, 547 U.S. at 847 & n.1 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6).
105 Id. at 850.
106 See United States v. Smith, 526 F.3d 306, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2008) (locating
the electronic monitoring of Smith-who could leave his residence only with State
permission-closer to prison than parole on the punishment continuum).
107 Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (quoting United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60,
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Against that background, the Samson Court asserted that "parolees
have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole
is more akin to imprisonment . .1. 08
Akin to imprisonment, yes, but as the Court had elsewhere
described, parole is also "very different" from imprisonment. 109 In a
different case, the Court also had alluded to "the undoubted minor
differences between probation and parole . . . ."110 In non-trivial
ways, parole and probation are not different at all."' To begin with,
parolees and probationers both pose sufficiently high risks of re-
offending so as to justify keeping quite close tabs on them.112 Both
groups are thus "set free in the world subject to restrictions intended
to facilitate supervision and guard against antisocial behavior""
such as association with gang members, possessing a gun, drug or
alcohol use, changing addresses without notice, or contacting
victims. Both know it too: parolees and probationers are told up
front that they are subject to suspicionless searches.114 And it is not
just parolees who are considered in custody, even while at large;
probationers also remain in custody, albeit "constructively.""'
Finally, when prosecutors allege disobedience on the part of parolees
or probationers, the process that is due for revocation is informal,
unencumbered by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.116
Given such similarities, lower courts long saw "no
constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment."'17 Samson, however, changed all that.
Without saying that parolees and probationers differ in only "minor"
ways,"' or instead occupy "near opposite ends of the punishment
scale,"119 Samson insisted that "parolees have fewer expectations of
63 (1st Cir. 1990)).
108 Id.
109 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
110 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973) (emphasis added).
... See Samson, 547 U.S at 861.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 852, 863 n.4.
115 People v. Cisneros, 224 Cal. Rptr. 452, 453-55 (Ct. App. 1986).
116 See Samson, 547 U.S at 849.
117 E.g., Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1083 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005).
118 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973).




privacy than probationers . "... 120 Though some were slow to come
around to the idea,121 the lower federal courts, with just one
holdout,122 accept as the law of the land Samson's conclusion that
parole and probation are constitutionally distinct; no state court has
held out. The constitutional implications of that distinction, however,
remain open.
D. READING RILEYRIGHT: NARROW OR BROAD?
Neither Knights nor Samson presented a suspicionless search
of a probationer. The likely occasion to put Samson's parole-
probation distinction into action is presented by the digital privacy
claims of probationers now litigating in the California Supreme
Court,123 whose attempt to absorb Knight and Samson into Riley
should land in the United States Supreme Court. Once there, if Riley
is limited to arrestees, the Court will deem suspicionless searches of
probationers' digital devices constitutional if authorized by narrowly
tailored, explicit electronics conditions. If Riley regulates police
practices apart from arrests, then such searches will be deemed
unconstitutional as to probationers, if not as to parolees. Meanwhile,
I want here to test the thesis that Riley's role in regulating searches
of probationers' digital devices is a matter of locating probationers in
relation to arrestees on the continuum of state restrictions on
autonomy.
Recall that the California appellate courts' basis for finding
Riley inapplicable to probationers is that unlike Riley, who, as an
arrestee, remained entitled to the "presumption of innocence" and
"the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled," probationers
are entitled to neither.124  Despite the superficial appeal of that
observation, arrestees have nothing like absolute liberty. On probable
120 Samson, 547 U.S. at 850.
121 See United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2011),
overruled by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(concluding that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by suspicionless searches).
122 Keating v. Pittston City, 643 F. App'x 219, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016).
123 See In re Ricardo P., 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883 (2015), review granted
February 17, 2016, S230923.
124 E.g., In re J.E., 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28, 36-37 (2016) (quoting United States
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
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cause, an arrestee may be handcuffed, transported to the
stationhouse, fingerprinted, booked, photographed,125 and, unless the
recent occupant of a car, thoroughly searched.126 All that for even
the most minor transgressions, including, to name just one, riding
with an unfastened seat belt.127 When an arrest is not by warrant, the
arrestee may be forced to wait in jail for 48 hours for a judicial
determination of probable cause. 128 On arriving at jail, a strip search
may follow regardless of the offense of arrest, 129 as may countless
suspicionless searches thereafter. 130 Once a judge has found probable
cause, the constitutional right to a speedy trial places only weak
pressure on the prosecution to charge and try an arrestee, even one
who remains in custody.13 1  Such (perfectly lawful) pretrial
punishment inflicted on arrestees is far from "absolute liberty."
That the timing of the intrusion-whether against an arrestee
or a probationer-is not crucial to Riley is indicated in lower-court
cases upholding warrantless cell-phone searches of motorists at the
Calexico border and of public schoolchildren, both occurring at
investigative stages under the "special needs" doctrine.132 Like the
Court's rulings in Katz, Dow Chemical, Kyllo, and Jones before it,
Riley is, at the highest level of generality, a meditation on the
tensions among privacy, technology, and police practices. But in a
much more specific sense, Riley is Chief Justice Roberts's hommage
to cell phones-life-altering instruments which a "visitor
from Mars might conclude . . . were an important feature of human
anatomy."133 Riley replaced the halting tone of Quon with knowing
nods to esoterica such as data encryption, remote wiping, gigabytes,
125 E.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
126 E.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 363-64 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
127 E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
128 E.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
129 E.g., Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322-23
(2012).
130 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-30 (1984).
131 E.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312-17 (1986).
132 See United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1014-20 (S.D. Cal.
2016) (based on special need of protecting the border); In re Rafael C., 200 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 305, 314-15 (2016) (based on special need of educating the young),
opinion superseded by In re R.C., 372 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2016).
133 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
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cloud computing, geo-fencing, and Faraday bags.134 By such
technical phenomena, Riley posits, we install our entire personhood
(from the sublime to the ridiculous) in our phones, whose capacities
to reveal dwarf those of the once-exalted repository of intimacy: the
diary.135
What Riley is not is an hommage to arrestees. In fact, the 8-
0-1 decision's only reference to the status of convicted persons is in
Justice Alito's concurrence, which traces searches incident to arrest
back nearly two centuries to "the interest which the State has in a
person guilty (or reasonably believed to be guilty) of a crime being
brought to justice .... "136 The quoted passage places arrestees (who
are believed guilty) on the same privacy plane as adjudicated
criminals (who are guilty). Indeed, I have not found a single item of
evidence that Riley is a narrow ruling elevating the rights of arrestees
alone, as opposed to a broad ruling elevating digital privacy across
the board. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit hardly overstated the
matter in recording that Riley "used sweeping language to describe
the importance of cell phone privacy." Riley not only finds digital
devices more private than automobiles,13 8 but remarkably, more
private even than homes:
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search
of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form
many sensitive records previously found in the home;
it also contains a broad array of private information
never found in a home in any form-unless the phone
i 1391S.
134 Id. at 2486-87, 2491.
135 Id. at 2490.
136 Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Dillon v. O'Brien [1887] 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245, 249-50 (Exch. Div.)
(Ir.)).
137 United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 611 (9th Cir. 2016).
138 E.g., United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the content one might find on a cell phone differs qualitatively
from what one might find in an automobile).
139 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
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So much for "the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle."140
Justifiably, Riley's "sweeping language"141 has extended beyond
searches incident to arrest to invalidate electronics conditions that cut
into the lawful spheres of the probationer's life that are unlikely to
peek into criminality. 14 2 Extending Riley's reach in such a fashion
cannot count as a denial of Samson's recognition of a difference in a
privacy sense between arrestees and probationers. Rather, it counts as
an acknowledgment hat Riley is unconcerned with that difference.
IV. CONCLUSION
In re L V. gave me a live opportunity to meditate on
constitutional snags in lower court criminal litigation concerning the
potential or actual use of suspicionless electronics earches as a way
of keeping tabs on probationers. With little help from those lower
courts on the implications of Supreme Court precedents-of
Knights, Samson, and Riley-I am predicting here that the
controversy will find its way to the top for resolution. Whatever
happens, I am persuaded that to view Riley as a narrow tract on the
limits of the arrest power is to cut the case off not from its rule or
holding or other stock conventions of opinion writing, but from its
feel, its tone-its vibe-which, for those with a knack for decoding
cases, is as identifiable a convention as any other.
140 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006).
141 Lara, 815 F.3d at 611.
142 See, e.g., id. (distinguishing cell phone data from types of property
appropriately subject to probation searches).
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